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aim is to provide police management and
others, such as politicians and public
officials, with a better insight into what in-
fluences which actions police officers per-
form and what possibilities police manage-
ment have to affect this.
We have observed what police officers
do when they are out on patrol, without
measuring police effectiveness or how fast
police officers do what they are doing.
Police patrol work is seen as constituted
by police activities. The main question ex-
plored in our study is ‘what’ determines
what is involved in police patrol work, and
how contextual factors can explain ‘why’
police officers do what they do, such as
level of urbanization, work load, group
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INTRODUCTION
Our study is about everyday police patrol
work. In this paper we focus on policing in
Norway, in particular on emergency patrol
and community beat policing. The findings
lead us to the conclusion that in Norway
community beat policing is not success-
fully implemented. On the basis of our
observations we identify some factors that
can help to explain these findings.
The main background for this study is
that the public and those who are respon-
sible for the management of police work
should know what officers do in order to
be able to give a meaningful interpretation
of police management and of the demo-
cratic control of the police. The project’s
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In this paper we present findings from a comparative study exploring police patrol work
in Europe. The study is about every day police patrol work, both emergency patrol and
community beat policing. We have systematically observed what police officers do
when they are out on patrol, and explored how contextual factors can explain ‘why’
police officers do what they do. Moreover we focus on policing in Norway. The main
question discussed is in what way police management can lead the patrols towards the
practicing of police strategies. After we have presented the methodological framework,
we introduce some findings from Norway. These lead us to the conclusion that in Nor-
way community beat policing is not successfully implemented. The study points to the
need for professional leadership in preference to management oriented to resource allo-
cation. The study indicates that if the police want to move from an old fashioned reacti-
ve style of policing towards community policing or problem oriented policing, they ha-
ve to do more than just ask emergency patrol officers to also fulfil the role of
community beat officer. However, it is not enough to appoint some officers as commu-
nity beat officers. If one really wants to get off the ground this different style of poli-
cing, one should appoint community beat police officers with managerial powers.
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vised by a command and control centre.
What the officers should give attention to
between citizen calls differs from place to
place. ‘Community beat policing’ is not as
standardized as emergency patrol. While
doing community beat policing, the of-
ficers normally work alone; they usually
do their patrol work in uniform but also re-
gularly in plainclothes, for example when
they are calling on citizens at home. As a
rule, a community beat officer’s basic as-
signment is to build up and maintain rela-
tionships with the public and/or to prevent
or tackle law and order problems, prefera-
bly in close cooperation with other welfare
agencies. In other words, the officers fol-
low a problem oriented style of policing.
When out on the beat, they walk or cycle,
but community beat officers also patrol in
a car. Different from emergency patrol of-
ficers, community beat patrol officers are
not supervised by a command and control
centre and as a rule they will not be as-
signed to citizen calls.
The method of the research is systematic
social observation. Systematic, because
observation is directed by structured pro-
tocols, including a list of variables that
have to be recorded about each incident.1
The method is social, since it is based on
participating observations in a police
team. This method is basically a qualitative
method. Since we make use of structured
protocols, we could speak of a qualitative
method with a systematic approach.
The research team consisted of seven pro-
ject leaders from five different countries:
the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany and Norway, and thirteen field
workers. Stol supervised the field work in
all participating countries, and is also able
to read the languages of the countries in-
volved. In all of the five countries we wan-
ted to make observations in two places:
one place representing police work in an
urban area and the other place representing
culture and police management. Police
management is just one of the factors in-
fluencing police actions; there are several
other factors such as the mentioned level
of urbanisation and information facilities.
Since police actions are important ele-
ments in the constitution of police perfor-
mance, one of the core issues in police
management is to give direction to what
police officers do or do not do when out
on patrol. The main question discussed in
this paper is in what way police manage-
ment can lead the patrols towards practi-
cing police strategies such as community
beat policing. We will first describe the
methodological framework, and thereafter
we will introduce some results from Nor-
way. In a concluding section we use these
findings to discuss various models of im-
plementing community beat policing, and
police management’s challenges in these
reforms.
SYSTEMATIC SOCIAL 
OBSERVATION
The design of the research is built on ear-
lier research on police patrol work in the
Netherlands and Belgium, in total seven-
teen observation studies (Stol 1996; Stol
et al. 2006). The aim is to elucidate the
characteristics and in particular the pecu-
liarities of local police patrol work, emer-
gency patrol as well as community beat
policing. For doing so, we need a method
to draw a  picture of patrol work and we
need a frame of reference to distinguish
between the more or less standard findings
and the non-standard or unusual ones.
Before we describe the design, we will
define emergency patrol as well as com-
munity beat policing. The emergency
patrol’s basic assignment is to supervise
their patrol area and react to citizen calls.
Most often they are uniformed police of-
ficers in a marked police car, usually two,
but in Norway often three, being super-
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values of all countries. For example obser-
vation of emergency patrol work in the
twelve cities may discover that 57 % of all
the incidents from all places have to do with
maintaining the law. This 57 % can function
as a reference number. However, the average
values are no more than a tool helping us
to discover special characteristics of local
police work, average values are not norms.
If some local police patrol work signifi-
cantly deviates from the average values, it
does not mean that this patrol work is
better or worse than the average, but it is
different. In this study we want to under-
stand what causes the difference.
The frame of reference makes it possible
to analyse the observations in a compara-
tive perspective, and we can use it to dis-
cover characteristic features of the patrol
work in question.4 Based on our syste-
matic social observation we have consti-
tuted a picture of patrol work using several
characteristics that are derived from the
kind of incidents the officers deal with.
The characteristics are:
1. Work load or the number of incidents
per hour.
2. Sort of incidents police patrol work
consists of, such as traffic, serious crime,
networking.
3. The outcome of incidents: do police
officers give a warning, fine someone
or perhaps make an arrest?
4. Police mobilisation: do the police come
into action because of a citizen call or
was the incident a police initiative?
5. Marginal persons the officers have to
deal with, such as addicts, mentally dis-
turbed persons, homeless persons.
6. Police knowledge of people in the
neighbourhood.
7. The use of information sources – since
a core issue in police work is the pro-
ducing of knowledge.
When certain characteristics deviate
from the average value, we search for an
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police work in an area with a low popu-
lation density. We also wanted to observe
emergency patrol as well as the local form
of community policing. The field work
was carried out in twelve places.2 In four
out of five countries we managed to get
access to the type of police teams we were
searching for.3
Between September 2005 and March
2007 we observed emergency patrol as
well as community policing, a total of 
24 observations. Each observation consi-
sted of us following the standard police
duty schedule during twenty shifts. The
field worker is attached to a group of
police officers, which means that he or she
will be out on patrol with different police
officers. The idea is to draw a picture 
of policing in a certain area. The field wor-
kers produced two key documents: their
completely worked-out field work notes
and SPSS code forms – one for each inci-
dent. In total the field workers observed
2,089 incidents during emergency patrol
(of which 199 in Oslo and 133 in Lille-
strøm) and 2,094 incidents during com-
munity beat policing (of which 155 in Oslo
and 82 in Lillestrøm). The field workers
made also notes about, for example, what
police officers told about priorities in po-
lice work, and about what the officers did
between the incidents. Management were
interviewed, and the field workers wrote
an additional field work report with infor-
mation about the city involved, the police
force’s organizational structure and local
police policy. Every description of an in-
cident together with the corresponding
SPSS code form went through a working
procedure that was designed to achieve the
highest possible level of inter-observer
reliability.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The basic idea with the frame of reference
is to compare local numbers with average
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traffic may indicate a certain proportion of
all incidents, not a proportion of time. We
start with presenting some tables from ob-
servations of emergency patrol and com-
munity beat patrol, and compare these
with the frame of reference. The results
will lead us to a discussion about the police
management role in the implementation of
community beat policing.
EMERGENCY PATROL
Table 1 shows how many incidents the
emergency patrol officers are involved in
per hour.
As you can see in Table 1, the Oslo figures
do not deviate from the reference numbers,
which indicate that emergency patrol work
in Oslo has no specific characteristics.
That is to say, emergency patrol in Oslo
might have many specific characteristics,
explanation in terms of the conceptual
model. The conceptual model consists of
seven influential factors, and is based on
earlier research.5 As illustrated in figure 1
(see page 81), three factors on top and the
one on the left refer to organizational 
issues. Three factors on the bottom of the
model refer to aspects of the sociological
environment of the organization. These
seven factors can help to explain what is
involved in local police patrol work, which
is in the centre of the model.
‘Basic assignment’ refers to the princi-
pal task or role the police officer in question
has to fulfil. Basic assignment is the answer
to the question ‘how do we structure our
organization’ or ‘what kind of police roles
do we wish to distinguish’. ‘Basic strategy’
is the answer to questions such as ‘what
are the principal elements of this police
role’ or ‘what are the basic ideas of this
kind of police work’. ‘Management con-
trol’ or ‘police leadership’ refers to every-
thing police chiefs on daily routine do to
stimulate or urge officers to undertake
specific actions when out on patrol. ‘In-
formation facilities’ refers to the databases
the officers have access to and it refers to
how easy it is for the officers to get access
to the data. ‘National features’ refers to
national peculiarities such as specific
pieces of legislation or cultural characteri-
stics that are typical for a certain country.
‘Local urbanisation’ refers to the number
of inhabitants per square kilometre.
‘Exceptional local circumstances’ refers to
phenomena that clearly dominate police
work in a certain area.
RESULTS FROM NORWAY
We will now present some of the figures
that follow from our observations, and
show how they lead us into the world of
police management. Introductorily it is
important to emphasise that a table where
50 % of all incidents lie in the sphere of
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of police patrol work
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
Table 1: Work load (incidents pr. hour)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Emergency Patrol
Incidents 1.8 1.4 **1.2
Citizen calls 0.8 0.6 0.6
Police initiatives 1.0 0.8 **0.6
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (independant T-test)
BASIC ASSIGNMENT
– police roles
– kind of duties to carry out
– work load
Organizational and national context
INFORMATION
FACILITIES
– national databases
– local equipment
POLICE PATROL WORK 
– profile (sort of incidents)
– settlement (outcome of incidents)
– nature (character of incidents)
MANAGEMENT CONTROL /
POLICE LEADERSHIP
– points of interest for today
BASIC STRATEGY
– ‘the way we do things
around here’
– way of patrolling
NATIONAL FEATURES
– legislation
– culture
EXCEPTIONAL LOCAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES
(relatively rare)
LOCAL URBANISATION
– number of calls
– anonymity
– opinions about incidents
fic unit located at Lillestrøm police stati-
on. Its main priority is to carry out road si-
de checks and take action against traffic
violations. Four times a year the traffic
unit organizes a large scale roadside check
in cooperation with other agencies and
with emergency patrol officers, but this is
not included in our empirical material.
It may also be relevant that the emergency
patrol officers have to cover a large patrol
area. As the chief of police stressed during
an interview, the officers have to drive
long distances from incident to incident.
The external geographical context may
therefore explain why the daily working
routines in Lillestrøm emergency patrol do
not leave much room for incidents on the
officer’s initiative. They are just too busy
travelling from A to B. Instead of a ‘stop
and search strategy’, which would cost
them too much time, we saw them using a
‘check on the move’ strategy, with help
from their colleagues from the incident
room. Since traffic checks on the move do
not include a police-citizen interaction,
these police initiatives are not incidents in
our study.
These deviations from the frame of refe-
rence point to a correlation between police
numbers and the proportion of traffic in
police patrol work (Stol et al. 2006). There
is a connection between proportion of
traffic and work load: the less occupied
the officers are, the more traffic incidents
(car stops and searches). Stol et al. (Stol et
al. 2006) found that what officers do bet-
ween citizens calls is remarkably the same
in almost all places: they keep an eye on
the traffic: they give attention to traffic
violations and they carry out car stops and
searches. The less citizen calls, the more
police officers will come into action of
their own accord in the sphere of traffic.
Consequently: increasing the police num-
bers means that police management de facto
give priority to car stops and searches,
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but this table does not make them visible.
The table for Lillestrøm shows us that
emergency patrol officers are involved in
few incidents per hour. Specifically, the
officers in Lillestrøm do not come into ac-
tion on their own accord so often. Table 2,
which provides us with information about
traffic incidents, indicates a way to under-
stand this.
The table shows that emergency patrol
work in Lillestrøm only has a small pro-
portion of traffic incidents. Especially
when police officers come into action on
their own accord, the proportion of traffic
is relatively small – no more than 29.5 %,
while the average percentage is 62.9. In
other words, Lillestrøm emergency patrol
officers do carry out significantly less car
checks than the average patrol officer
does. As a consequence, the officers in
Lillestrøm come into action on their own
initiative less often than ‘the average of-
ficer’ does. Another way to understand the
small proportion of police initiatives in
Lillestrøm can be the role of the manage-
ment. Findings indicate that emergency
patrol officers are not asked by manage-
ment to take action in the sphere of proac-
tive policing outside the area of traffic.
During interviews, the chief of police clai-
med that officers have no time left for poli-
ce actions on their own initiative.
It is not immediately clear why police
officers in Lillestrøm do carry out so few
car checks. This finding seems to be con-
trary to the fact that traffic is prioritized in
Lillestrøm’s activity plan. However,
Romerike police district has a special traf-
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Table 2: Proportion of traffic (%)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Emergency Patrol
All incidents 41.6 37.7 **30.1
Citizen calls 18.9 9.5 30.6
Police initiatives 62.9 69.1 **29.5
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (Z-score for proportions)
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How is the basic assignment influencing
the style of CBP in Oslo and Lillestrøm?
In all countries in our study, including
Norway6, a core issue in policy documents
is that the police have to work on impro-
ving the relationship between the police
and the public, focusing on communicati-
on and dialogue with the public. Commu-
nity beat patrol officers are expected to
establish and maintain relationships with
the public. We have observed and recorded
the number of incidents where the officers
come in contact with citizens they have
had previous contact with. The idea is that
officers who have established a close rela-
tion to their neighbourhood more often
will know the individuals they meet on pa-
trol and during incidents. Table 4 shows
the results.
Table 4 shows that the proportion of
incidents in which the community beat
patrol officers in Oslo meet someone they
know is very small compared to the average:
1.3 %, while the average is 30.9 %. The
second smallest proportion was observed in
Aarschot, Belgium (13.6 %) and the third
smallest in Lillestrøm, Norway (18.3 %).
unless police management is capable of
ensuring that police officers do otherwise –
which is rarely the case. The police
management are of course able to define
other priorities than traffic, and they do.
But the problem is that they do not trans-
late priorities such as ‘violence’, ‘youth’,
and ‘drugs’, into concrete activities that
police officers can (and should) undertake
when out on patrol. Consequently, police
officers stick to what is easy for them to
do: pick out a licence plate and check it,
stop a car and check its driver.
COMMUNITY BEAT POLICING
Table 3 shows that community beat poli-
cing in Oslo as well as in Lillestrøm has
relatively few incidents per hour.
This can be explained by the fact that the
officers come into action of their own in-
itiative less often that ‘the average officer’
does. Community beat patrol (CBP) of-
ficers in both cities are quite reactive and
not really proactive – compared to the ave-
rage. How can this be understood?
Firstly, CBP in Oslo as well as Lille-
strøm is done by ‘regular’ police officers.
They are focused on emergency patrol
routines and other established police
tasks; they are not community beat patrol
officers as described in our definition.
When they are on the streets in the role of
‘community beat patrol officer’ they per-
form this task as if they were officers in an
emergency patrol car, waiting for head-
quarters to assign incident-led jobs. The
consequence is that police officers assi-
gned to community beat patrol are being
assigned to jobs by a command and con-
trol centre. The low number of incidents
on the initiative of the police may partly
be explained by the organization that the
incident room has the opportunity to
assign CBP officers to incidents, leaving
them with less time to act on their own in-
itiative.
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Table 3: Work load (incidents pr. hour)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Community Beat Patrol
Incidents 2.6 ** 1.8 **1.5
Citizen calls 0.4 0.4 0.6
Police initiatives 2.2 ** 1.0 **1.0
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (independent T-test)
Table 4: Proportion of incidents in which police officers
meet someone they know (%)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Community Beat Patrol
Incidents 30.9 ** 1.3 18.3
Traffic 7.5 0.0 6.7
Social problems 57.5 ** 6.3 42.9
Other 38.3 ** 1.3 22.2
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (Z-score for proportions)
knowledge about citizens, since younger
police officers seldom have the specific
background which the older ones have
(Stol et al. 2006).
CBP in Oslo shows a small proportion
of ‘networking’ and ‘internal jobs’. This
confirms the downsizing of building rela-
tionships with the public, and might have
to do with orientation towards law and
order. The proportion of networking for
CBP in Oslo is especially small compared
to other large cities in the study. This may
be because of a high degree of motorized
patrol and presumably also because of
police priorities in community beat patrol
are less focussed on networking and more
on reduction of crimes such as pick-
pocketing and theft of cars. Problem Ori-
ented Policing (POP) in Lillestrøm is also
basically related more to law enforcement
than networking. For example, they work
specifically against potential criminal ca-
ses using surveillance and undercover po-
lice work. The officers get information
from the intelligence service so they
could work towards specific addresses or
people known to the police, especially
concerning drugs or gambling. These as-
signments required working in an unmar-
ked car without wearing a uniform, which
does not add much to networking with
the general public.
Looking at the outcome of incidents
(whether police officers give a warning,
fine someone or perhaps make an arrest)
in Oslo outside the area of traffic, the pro-
portion in which officers on CBP fine a
citizen is also relatively large (4.2 %
against an average of 1.0 %; p<0,01). This
finding confirms that CBP in Oslo is
directed towards maintaining law and
order. The CBP officers’ in Oslo high
degree of repressive measures might be
caused by the officer’s orientation towards
law and order, and confirm a working style
oriented towards repressive action.
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Even when the officers in Oslo deal with
social problems – like domestic disputes,
homeless persons, mentally disturbed per-
sons – they meet an acquaintance in a re-
latively small proportion of all incidents.
Population density may be of relevance
here. But this is not the decisive factor,
since the other cities in our study with a
high population density do not have a
proportion that is significantly smaller
than the average: Brussel: 63.4 %, Gronin-
gen: 40.8 %, Leeuwarden: 30.8 %, Bo-
chum: 25.0 %. It is not possible to identify
a specific type of incident that is responsi-
ble for this to be 1.3 % in Oslo. It seems
an overall phenomenon. CBP officers in
Oslo are particularly not strong in estab-
lishing and maintaining police-citizen
relationships.
Although in Lillestrøm the proportion of
incidents in which the officers meet some-
one they know is no more than 18.3 %,
this proportion is not significantly smaller
than the average. The organisation of the
community beat patrol in Oslo as well as
Lillestrøm is done by ‘regular’ police of-
ficers. Their mind is set towards reactive
policing, not towards proactive commu-
nity policing. Probably because Lillestrøm
is a smaller community, the police officers
still meet someone they know once in a
while.
Community beat policing in Oslo shows
weak ties with the general public, which is
confirmed by the finding that the police
officers in Oslo are also less acquainted
with their marginal persons than their
colleagues elsewhere. In Lillestrøm the
police officers quite often are familiar
with marginal people, and this can be ex-
plained by both the basic police role in
Lillestrøm plus the relatively small pro-
portion of marginal persons in the area.
However, both in Lillestrøm and Oslo the
police officers patrolling the streets are
quite young, and this may affect their
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Based on our observations we can dis-
tinguish between five models of com-
munity policing. The models are what one
may call ‘ideal types’. They are analytical
constructs grounded in empirical research.
We have not observed one of these models
in a pure form. However, if one looks at
police patrol work in a certain place, it is
quite easy to recognize one of these models
as the dominating structuring principle
behind community beat policing.
1. The first one may be called the support
model. In this model, community beat
officers are put at the service of other
authorities, such as police chiefs and
judicial bodies. We have observed this
model to a certain degree in Belgium.
2. The second model is what may be called
a reactive model of community policing.
Officers assigned to community beat
policing are put at the service of local
society. A part of their work consists of
dealing with calls from the public. It is
not difficult to recognize community
beat patrol in Oslo and Lillestrøm in
this model.
3. The third model is the POP model, from
problem oriented policing. Perhaps we
could better call this model POP-light.
Community beat patrol officers conduct
an analysis of criminological and/or
social problems in their neighbourhood
and then proactively try to solve these
problems, preferably with the help of
other welfare agencies.
4. The fourth model is the full-POP model.
This one is the same as POP-light but in
addition to POP-light, emergency patrol
officers are put at the service of the
community beat officers. In other
words, in this model community beat
officers give direction to what emergency
patrol officers undertake during the
time between two calls or during the
time they are not assigned to emergency
patrol.
To sum up, the observations of the com-
munity beat patrols in Oslo involve a
small proportion of networking and of in-
cidents in which the officers meet an
acquaintance. There are large proportions
of traffic violation and order maintenance.
This can be explained by the determinant
‘basic strategy’ such as the way of patrol-
ling: which for the most part is motorized
patrol and seldom foot patrol. Since the
incident room assigns the cars for jobs ac-
cording to a priority list, the orientation is
towards law and order. Although this is not
part of the police manager’s policy at the
station, the incident-led focus is in line
with the police officers’ understanding of
‘real policing’. Since the patrol work ob-
served was not ‘real’ community beat pa-
trol, the finding indicates a gap between
police strategy, basic assignment and the
profile of the police patrol work. Primarily
basic assignment, but also the way of pa-
trolling and managerial control (as-
signments of jobs via the incident room)
for community beat patrol, is similar to
emergency patrol. Consequently, these two
ways of patrolling look alike.
DISCUSSION
When community beat policing is intro-
duced, it is possible to distinguish between
two implementation philosophies. The
philosophy we have observed in Oslo and
Lillestrøm is what may be called the philo-
sophy of the wide movement. In this vision
all police officers should move towards
community beat policing at the same time.
All police officers have to move simul-
taneously from a reactive to a proactive
style of policing. The opposing strategy is
what we could call the strategy of the
pioneers. Some officers start with com-
munity beat policing, stimulating others to
do their share in this movement. And we
can imagine several strategies that lie
somewhere between these two far ends.
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To conclude, we will present three ex-
amples of organizational structures that
we have observed in our study. Each
represents one of the above models. The
first is the situation we have observed in
Oslo and Lillestrøm (model 2).
At the top of the organizational chart is
the police management in the form of a
police chief and a deputy chief. In the
centre is the group of officers who are
assigned to basic police services such as
emergency patrol and community beat
patrol. The officers rotate between these
tasks. Since dominant police culture is
emergency patrol, these police officers
tend to do community beat policing in an
emergency patrol style. The results indicate
that this way of organizing community
beat patrol is not the way to successfully
implement this style of policing.
The second example is the situation we
have observed in, among other places,
Groningen and Assen, the Netherlands
(model 3).
At the top of this organizational chart is
police management. Then there are two
different lines top-down. The one on the
right is how emergency patrol is organized,
exactly the same as in the example above.
The top-down line on the left shows how
community beat patrol is organized. Com-
munity beat patrol officers report directly
to the chief of the unit and it is these officers
who are assigned to community beat patrol.
To ensure that the two types of officers
cooperate, they have to consult with each
other. The idea is that community beat
officers inform the others about actual
problems that need police attention. Since
community beat patrol officers fall directly
under the chief of the unit, they are seen as
important. The effect of this, however, is
that in everyday practice no one manages
community beat policing. The deputy
chief is not in charge. The chief of the unit
is too busy. In everyday practice we have
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5. The last model is the same as the full
POP model but with no officers assigned
to emergency patrol. Emergency patrol
as such does no longer exist. If there is
an alarm call any officer may go to the
scene to settle the incident. After the in-
cident is settled he or she continues
working on priorities in the light of
problem oriented policing. We have not
observed this model in practice. So far,
this model only exists in the mind of
some police chiefs and in some policy
documents.
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Model 2: Different ways to organize CBP: Oslo and 
Lillestrøm (‘wide movement’)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
Model 3: Different ways to organize CBP: Groningen and
Assen (‘pioneering movement’)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
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Norway as illustrations, these findings
indicate that police patrol work in Oslo,
both emergency patrol and community
beat patrol, is particularly directed towards
maintaining law and order and not so
much towards establishing and main-
taining contact between the police and the
public.
What we learned during the course of this
study is that police management is strong
on basic assignment – at designing a new
organisation and moving police officers
from one department to another. Do we
need to do more on youth problems? Just
appoint ten more juvenile police officers.
Do we want to improve police-citizen 
relationships? Let’s appoint ten more com-
munity beat officers. But police manage-
ment is weak at the next step: basic strategy.
What is our idea of community beat poli-
cing? What exactly does it mean to be a
community beat patrol officer? Of course
it is clear that community beat patrol offi-
cers should establish and maintain relati-
onships between the police and the public.
But police management have to express a
clear picture of what a community beat pat-
rol officer should be doing on a day to day
basis. How does one do ‘community beat
observed that community beat officers
practice a style of policing that is different
from the emergency patrol style: more
towards proactive policing, more towards
problem oriented policing, more towards
building relationships between the police
and the community. However, there is quite
a distance between the two types of
officers. It is very difficult for the com-
munity beat officers to push the other
officers towards another style of policing.
The third and last example shows a
variation on the second one. We have ob-
served this in the city of Leeuwarden, the
Netherlands (model 4).
The main difference is that this third
organizational chart does not know a
deputy chief. Instead of this official, the
chart shows the position of a community
beat officer with executive powers. This
community beat officer plays two roles.
Firstly, he goes out on patrol, but only now
and then, since he has another and more
important role to fulfil: he runs a group of
police officers, and he assigns jobs to
them in the sphere of community policing.
In this way emergency patrol officers, if
we still might call them so, are directed
towards a community policing style of
policing. The effect of this is that police
officers in Leeuwarden, patrolling the
inner city, are less oriented on traffic vio-
lations and more on other problems in the
neighbourhood. For example emergency
patrol in Leeuwarden consists of only a
small proportion of traffic incidents. It is
the smallest of all twelve cities in our
study. The next smallest was the one that
we have observed in Lillestrøm.
CONCLUSION
The outcomes of our study illustrate that
the tables that constitute our frame of
reference, such as the proportion of traf-
fic, are indicators of important features of
police patrol work. Using results from
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Model 4: Different ways to organize CBP: Leeuwarden
(‘CBP in command’)
Source: Stol/Gundhus/Runhovde/Rønning
style of policing, one should appoint com-
munity beat police officers with manageri-
al powers.
We need police management that is cap-
able of giving directions for what police
officers should do. After all, only then it
can be useful to increase police in num-
bers, and only then ‘more police officers
on the streets’ will not automatically mean
‘more traffic checks’. Only if the basic
strategy is clear, it is useful to put ‘more
blues on the beat’. It is the task of police
management to keep the debate going
about what are good practices in terms of
police activities. It is their task to set goals
and to evaluate police effectiveness. Conse-
quently, in the end it is also their task to
decide what kind of activities a certain type
of police officer should or should not
undertake – because police activities are a
key factor of police effectiveness.
88
policing’. Does a community beat officer
have to write tickets? Does he or she visit
schools? If so, to do what? Does such an
officer walk the beat in uniform? There are
so many questions about how one could
and should fulfil a certain police role.
The study points to the need for profes-
sional leadership in preference to manage-
ment oriented to resource allocation. If the
police want to move from an old fashioned
reactive style of policing towards commu-
nity policing or problem oriented policing,
they have to do more than just ask emer-
gency patrol officers to also fulfil the role
of a community beat officer. And nor is it
enough to appoint some officers as com-
munity beat officers. Although their patrol
work is different, they do not have the
power to change the rest of the organizati-
on. Our study indicates that if one really
wants to get off the ground this different
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studies, Stol et al. made an attempt to come to a
conceptual model for police patrol work, meant
to give impetus to the further development of a
theory (Stol et al. 2006, 170–175). After the study
this model is redesigned and extended, and we
revised the conceptual model of Stol et al. (Stol et
al. 2006) into figure 1.
6 White paper 42 (2004–2005).
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1 An incident is here defined as each encounter
between a police officer and a citizen. We also
speak of an incident in case of emergency calls
that are passed on to the officers but that are not
followed by an encounter between the officers
and the public. An encounter is reported if a
police officer and a citizen have verbal or non-
verbal contact and the officer is performing in
the role of the police.
2 The twelve places are: Groningen (NL), Leeu-
warden (NL), Assen (NL), Roskilde (DK), Hille-
rød (DK), Bochum (D), Münster (D), Brussel (B),
Dendermonde (B), Aarschot (B), Oslo (N) and
Lillestrom (N).
3 Denmark is the exception here, since both of the
police teams were located in the countryside.
4 The method and the frame of reference are for
free. They are both well documented in English
and they are what we call today ‘freeware’ be-
cause we believe that if we want to develop police
studies in Europe, it is important that we can use
each other’s research methods and that we, as a
result from that, can compare our research fin-
dings and learn from each other.
5 In 2004, on the basis of the work of Sherman
(Sherman 1980) and Bayley (Bayley 1985; Bayley
1994), and methodologically mixed observational
